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A spectacular growth and fall in the volume of Russia’s non-monetary trade 
(NMT) during the transition from plan to market has caught many economists by 
surprise. In spite of numerous suggestions aimed at clarifying the issue, the development 
of NMT in Russia has remained a puzzle due to a number of reasons. Some researchers 
sought explanation in the logic of individual rational choice. They asserted that managers 
opted for NMT to maximize their share of firm’s revenue at the expense of other 
claimants or to improve the bargaining position of the firm vis-à-vis suppliers and 
consumers. The trouble with this line of reasoning is that it goes contrary to empirical 
evidence. For example, the references to infringement of property rights of outsiders or 
informational asymmetries with regard to partners are essentially of static nature.  
Therefore, if such explanation were true, one would expect that NMT stood on particular 
levels. On the contrary, the Russia’s NMT showed remarkable dynamics thus challenging 
researchers to spell out how, say, informational asymmetries might grow and fall steadily 
over time. Other researchers expected to find the answer by drawing parallels with the 
episodes of NMT in other countries, particularly in hyperinflationary environment. They 
noted that when inflation erodes the purchasing power of money, agents become 
increasingly unwilling to accept money as the means of payment. Since NMT offers an 
alternative, they concluded that Russians chose it to hedge against inflation. However, the 
Russia’s NMT ballooned against the background of falling inflation, thus casting doubt 
on the role that inflation played in its promotion. 
A promising explanation for the development of the Russia’s NMT can be found 
in the burgeoning literature on the credit channel of monetary policy. Its general concept 
is rather uncontroversial. The idea is that troubles in financial markets affect   3
entrepreneurs who do not own sufficient funds to finance ongoing projects. As money 
becomes dear or impossible to obtain, the projects with low payoffs or benefits that 
cannot be pledged ex ante are cancelled triggering recession. The suggestion that 
entrepreneurs can avoid this outcome if they manage to compensate other claimants with 
non-monetary means of payment is a natural extension of the same proposition. 
Unfortunately, the profession has yet to decide on the existence of the credit channel of 
monetary policy, which means that the paper cannot take this proposition for granted.
1 
Thus, presenting evidence that links NMT with monetary policy changes in a particular 
country, the paper pursues the dual objective of explaining the reason for the Russia’s 
NMT through reference to the credit channel and contributing to the debate on its 
existence in general. 
The paper uses two lines of argumentation. First, it identifies several structural 
breaks in the NMT series and links them to major political events that had repercussions 
in financial markets. In this respect, the paper is closely related to Bernanke (1983) who 
states that banking crises affect the real sector directly. Second, it shows that the 
transitory fluctuations in the producers’ demand for money and unavailability of external 
funds are positively serially correlated with the short-run changes in the NMT series. This 
result is consistent with the proposition advanced by the supporters of the idea of 
microeconomic origin of credit rationing, e.g. Holmström and Tirole (2000). They say 
that, contrary to the Modigliani-Miller theorem, the source of financing matters if 
banking intermediation is imperfect. As firms experience an outflow of liquid funds and 
                                                           
1 In his influential book, Walsh (2003, p. 362) concludes that “skepticism still surrounds the 
existence, and importance, of the credit channel”.   4
have to rely on expensive external financing, they choose either to cut production or, as 
in the Russian case, to resort to NMT. 
The paper consists of six sections. It starts with a definition of NMT and moves to 
a rather agnostic consideration of theories and evidence that suggest why producers turn 
to NMT. The proposition that NMT and monetary trade are alternatives chosen to save on 
transaction costs is taken as the basis for statistical analysis that follows. Section 2 
investigates the time pattern of the Russia’s NMT and determines that it is time-
stationary with a break. This result suggests that the NMT is an inertial development set 
in motion by structural changes in economic environment. Section 3 investigates 
institutional innovations associated with the break and explains how they affect the cost 
and availability of external finance. First, it shows that the default of 1998 made a lasting 
impact on the composition of money holdings. As the fraction of funds internal to 
enterprises grew as a result of import substitution caused by post-default currency 
depreciation, firms’ limited access to external funds constrained them less and they 
returned to monetary trade. Second, the section finds that as the demand for domestic 
products picked up, trade turnover accelerated and producers needed less liquidity to 
maintain inventories. Section 4 determines that apart from the break associated with the 
default, the NMT series exhibits three more structural breaks. An investigation of causes 
for the breaks reveals a link between major political events and the dynamics of financial 
parameters. This is interpreted as further evidence that state policy changes affected the 
composition of liquid funds and trade turnover thus imposing constraints on the choice of 
trade. Section 5 shifts attention from structural to short-run dynamics in financial 
parameters and NMT. It shows that transitory fluctuations of the de-trended series of the   5
composition of money funds and trade turnover are positively serially correlated with the 
similarly de-trended NMT series. This result suggests that the link between NMT and the 
cost of and access to external funds goes beyond structural dependency. Section 6 
reiterates the main steps in argumentation. 
 
1.  Non-monetary Trade: Theoretical Issues 
The concept of NMT should be carefully defined because often economists 
incorrectly associate it with spot barter. While spot barter comprises a part of NMT, 
various debt clearance schemes that do not involve money to complete transactions are 
used more commonly.
2 They take a number of forms. For example, trade partners locked 
along the same technological chain, say, a coal mine and electric plant, can find 
expedient to clear mutual debts through bookkeeping operations. Bills of exchange issued 
by large companies may circulate as the means of payments before they come to the 
issuer on maturity. In both instances traders do not need money to operate, which is the 
feature that distinguishes NMT from monetary trade.
3 
                                                           
2 By all accounts, spot barter has not been the dominant part in the Russian NMT. For example, 
Commander and Mumssen (2000, Table 2.2) report that offsets and other types of trade – bills of exchange, 
etc. – accounted for around 60 percent of NMT in industrial sales and input purchases and up to 80-90 
percent of non-monetary deals made with utility providers and tax authorities in 1998. 
3 The origin of the misperception that NMT is barter can be traced to textbooks on monetary 
economics, which, for didactic purposes, contrast money with barter explaining that money has evolved as 
a mechanism to overcome difficulties associated with the double coincidence of wants. Taken out of the 
context, this explanation leads to the conclusion that if agents do not use money in trade, they barter their 
wares. 
Some economists believe that this view is counterfactual, e.g. see Dalton (1982). They assert that 
historically barter does not precede money but develops together with monetary trade. This line of 
reasoning implies that agents view two modes of trade as alternatives. Their choice depends not so much on 
the stage of historical process but the comparison of transaction costs that they entail. Under certain 
circumstances agents use NMT because it is the least costly, for example in hyperinflation. The resilience 
of barter clubs in developed market economies is consistent with this proposition. The report issued by 
International Reciprocal Trade Association, Chicago states that barter transactions amounted to $ 7.8 
billions in 2001 (see http://www.irta.com/ → PR and Press Releases → “Commercial Barter Grows by 
Double Digits for Record Third Year”).   6
The ambiguity in the definition of NMT has been unfortunate. Being misled into 
thinking that barter is the only alternative to monetary trade, economic theorists have 
generally ignored inter-temporal NMT. For example, the search model of money by 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) considers the following choice that an agent faces. If she 
chooses to barter her products, the number of suitable partners becomes small. If she sells 
for cash, she incurs transaction costs associated with temporary holding of money. In this 
setting, the tradeoff takes the form of exchanging the probability of successful trading for 
the cost of keeping money funds. Although this model can be expanded to include credit 
arrangements, it leaves outside the difference between the costs of external and internal 
finance.
4 This gap in modeling makes it inappropriate for an empirical investigation that 
puts emphasis on the cost of financing.
5 
The fact that monetary theory is ambivalent with the respect to NMT may explain 
the abundance of hypotheses advanced by the researchers who have studied the Russia’s 
NMT. Many of these explanations have been somewhat detached from empirical 
foundations and never tested.
6 Works that have generated empirical results fall in two 
major groups. The first emphasizes microeconomic considerations, apparently, reflecting 
the fact that cross-sectional data were first to appear. For example, Guriev and Kvassov 
(2000) suggest that oligopolists use NMT to discriminate in prices. They investigate if the 
                                                           
4 See, among others, Li (2001) who incorporates credit arrangements in the search model of 
money. Predictably, the availability of credit makes NMT a more appealing choice, thus indicating the link 
between the search model of money and Wicksellian model of pure credit. 
5 A more promising but insufficiently developed venue of investigation is suggested by 
Kocherlakota (1998). He shows that if a central agency records all transactions and clears them on 
completion instantaneously, no money is necessary for such an economy. The proposition that money saves 
on the costs of record keeping rationalizes on the aforementioned example that companies locked in long-
term relationship use less money in mutual trade. The reason is that their record-keeping costs are low. The 
same argument applies to utility providers who need to record consumers’ purchases on technical grounds. 
6 A reader can find a good summary of works on NMT in the transition economies in Seabright 
and Humphrey (2000).   7
Russia’s NMT was more likely to occur in oligopolistic environment, which they 
approximate with the concentration ratio CR4, and find some statistical evidence that the 
CR4 and NMT are positively correlated. Guriev et al (2002) propose that indebted firms 
turn to NMT because they cannot obtain new credit. They find strong correlation between 
the Russian firms’ reliance on NMT and their exposure to debts.
7 In both papers the 
authors control for firm’s size, its export fraction in sales, regional location, and industrial 
affiliation, which are all found to have statistically significant coefficients. The other 
group of works aims at testing several hypotheses that are considered equally plausible a 
priori. The works by Carlin et al (2000), Marin et al (2000), and Commander et al (2002) 
explore such diverse reasons for NMT in various transition economies as inflation or tax 
avoidance, postponement of costly restructuring, and state subsidization. They arrive at a 
broadly similar conclusion that liquidity problems were responsible for NMT growth.
8 
The multitude of explanations for NMT that bear some sign of plausibility is 
frustrating. Yet, a careful examination of the obtained results shows that they are all 
compatible with a single proposition. Agents turn to NMT when monetary trade becomes 
more expensive or infeasible. The detected individual differences in the use of NMT 
correspond to various components of transaction costs associated with two types of trade. 
For example, a wider use of NMT by large firms may reflect their role as local 
clearinghouses, which their smaller customers use to complete transactions with one 
                                                           
7 This finding is unsurprising because, as the above discussion shows, debt arrangements figure 
prominently in NMT. Thus causality should be reversed: it is a growth in NMT that lead to an increase in 
debt. There might be two-way causality after the default of 1998 when some firms retired their otherwise 
unrecoverable old debt through return deliveries as Granger causality tests performed by the author have 
shown. 
8 The work by Brana and Maurel (1999) does not belong to either group. It sets a research agenda 
similar to this paper’s studying the long-term relationship between the Russia’s NMT and monetary 
parameters. Its conclusions are broadly compatible with the results obtained here. Unfortunately, their 
paper did not address several important questions.   8
another.
9 Since this additional benefit lowers the cost of trade credit that large firms 
obtain, they rely on NMT more extensively. The finding that some regions are more 
exposed to NMT than average can be a sign of credit rationing that enterprises located in 
depressed regions, such as coal mining Kemerovo oblast, or independent minded national 
republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, faced.
10 Then, stricter requirements for credit 
eligibility are responsible for regional differences in the use of NMT.
11 The fact that 
exporters or producers of consumables used NMT less can be interpreted as an indication 
of their lesser need for external financing because their customers, foreigners and 
households, paid normally in cash.
12 These and other examples are consistent with the 
proposition advanced in this paper, which is that growing cost and unavailability of 
financial credit pushed producers towards NMT. Let us turn now to discussion the 
problem with the firm’s liquidity and how it is solved in general. 
Suppose a firm has sufficient capital, or sunken investment, to undertake a 
particular project that generates a strictly positive expected return. Further, assume that it 
takes time before the project is completed and that the firm uses labor and other non-
                                                           
9 For example, large companies may issue bills of exchange that circulate within the area 
providing lacking liquidity for small, credit-constrained consumers. 
10 All three regions had larger than average exposure to NMT according to author’s observations. 
This proposition is congruent with the view expressed in Woodruff (1999). He considers the Russia’s NMT 
to be a consequence of political struggle between center and periphery for control of local resources. When 
the center cut on subsidies to rebellious regions, they responded with greater reliance on NMT, particularly 
collecting taxes in kind. 
11 OECD Economic Survey of the Russian Federation (Chapter 3, 1999-2000, Paris) suggests that 
it is local patronage that explains inter-regional differences. The idea is that since local taxes are easier to 
collect in-kind, the logic of tax competition between local and central governments prompts the former to 
stimulate NMT. Both Marin et al (2000) and Commander et al (2002) have found weak evidence that firms 
are pressured by local authorities to use NMT. 
12 The finding that the concentration ratio is positively correlated with NMT is somewhat 
inconsistent with the liquidity theory of NMT. However, this result can occur because of model 
misspecification. Since dummies for sectoral affiliation and sectoral CR4 index represent the same 
information, in actual calculation they should be distinguished by applying them to different sectors. Then 
CR4 index may catch inter-sectoral differences in the exposure to NMT that are irrelevant to oligopolistic 
power. For example, utility providers belong to oligopolistic sectors. Yet, they might have more exposure 
to NMT in Russia because they were better suited to conduct clearing operations and not because they   9
storable inputs during this period. Let the benefit of the project cannot be pledged ex ante 
due to, say, time inconsistency. Then, other claimants such as workers and suppliers 
request compensation before the project is completed. This explains why firms need 
liquid funds to operate. The total value of the claims that the firm pays before it realizes 
its benefit determines the amount of liquid funds that it needs either amass in advance or 
procure from external sources. The choice between two sources of financing matters 
because external funds are more costly due to several reasons. First, often the 
entrepreneur cannot commit ex ante to undertake the agreed project and creditors worry 
that loans will be diverted. Second, even he can, it is possible that the project will not 
generate the expected benefit due to individual riskiness. Third, supposedly secure 
projects can fail because market conditions change before the project has been finished. 
Each of the above considerations explains why creditors charge a risk premium thus 
making external funds more expensive than internal financing. 
As the expected riskiness of the project increases in general, creditors raise the 
risk premium. This increase is not necessarily reflected in a higher interest rate. Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) show that it is irrational to raise the risk premium forever because a 
systemic growth in the cost of external finance adversely affects the pool of loan 
applicants that becomes increasingly populated with dishonest or risky clients. As 
creditors realize that they may not get the principal back if interest rate increases further, 
they keep it below the equilibrium level. As demand for loans exceeds its supply the 
creditors discriminate among applicants by severing contractual obligations such as 
requesting high collateral.
13 This situation is representative of credit rationing. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
discriminated among customers. 
13 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for formal modeling of the credit rationing.   10
On the demand side, if the cost of external financing keeps growing, firms 
respond in a number of ways. They cut on projects with lower positive return thus 
triggering a recession.
14 The firms change the composition of projects favoring 
undertakings with a shorter production cycle. Finally, if renegotiations with other 
claimants are possible, the firms retain the projects in which workers, suppliers, or tax 
authorities are more likely to accept non-monetary means of payment.
15 The last 
consideration suggests a link between the cost and availability of external funds and the 
choice of trade. This is the topic that the present paper explores. 
 
2.  The Russia’s Non-monetary Trade: Econometric Issues 
The main data set used in the paper is the NMT series constructed by the Russian 
Economic Barometer (REB). It is shown on Figure 1.
16 
The preceding discussion has led to the proposition that producers turn to NMT 
when monetary trade becomes more expensive or infeasible. If this hypothesis is true, the 
presented series and some, yet undetermined, indicator(s) of the cost and availability of 
external funds should be serially correlated. However, it is technically incorrect to 
proceed with statistical analysis of the NMT series by the means of OLS regression. The 
problem is the series shown on Figure 1 is likely to be non-stationary. Then, its analysis  
                                                           
14 The last consideration is explored in Holmström and Tirole (1998). They claim that under 
certain circumstances public supply of liquidity increases social welfare. Their insight explains why the 
infusion of credit after the default of 1998 was more beneficial to the Russian economy than many 
expected.  
15 The paper ignores the possibility that Russian producers learned a trick that made money 
unnecessary in trade as counterfactual. If they did, they would not abandon NMT after 1998 en masse.  
16 REB is a laboratory associated with the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relationships (IMEMO) in Moscow. It has collected monthly data on the fraction of NMT in total sales 
since February 1992, one month after trade and prices were liberalized, up to now. REB sends a monthly 
survey to about 500 mainly established industrial firms receiving around 200 responses on average. The 
responses are aggregated and a simple average for the fraction of NMT in total sales is published. More 
information about REB is presented at the website http://www.imemo.ru/barom/.   11
 
Figure 1: Fraction of non-monetary trade in total sales, average sample size is 
around 200. Sources: Woodruff (1999), Fig. 4, p. 148] for 1992; Russian Economic Trends Quarterly 
(1q-1998, fig. 32, p. 5) for 1993-September 1997 and (2q-2002, Table 46, p. 243 and Fig. 48, p. 246) for 
December 2000-December 2001; and Gara, Mario (2001). “The Emergence of Non-monetary Means of 
Payment in the Russian Economy”, Post-Communist Economies, 13, 1: 5-39, Table 5 for October 1997-
November 2000. 
 
may generate spurious results.
17 To prevent this from happening, one needs either to 
difference the series until it becomes stationary, or to transform it using the method of 
cointegration. Since the last option provides richer opportunities for research, it should be 
explored first. A brief explanation of the method of cointegration is in order. The term 
‘cointegration’ is coined by Engle and Granger (1987). They respond to the critique that 
differencing, that time series analysts routinely use to solve the problem of non-
stationarity, erases important information. Engle and Granger claim that if two non-
stationary variables trend together, their relationship is potentially of long-run character. 

























specification along with other, stationary, variables. Then, a researcher can proceed with 
a regular OLS regression without worrying that the obtained results are spurious.
18 
Let us check the NMT series for non-stationarity. Its presence is commonly 
detected using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test that is suitable for autoregressive 
(AR) processes often present in time series. The test is based on the regression of the 
form 
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where ∆y t is the first difference in y t, ∆y t-j is the j-th difference in y t-1, t stands for time 
trend, and p is the number of lags for AR (p) process. The null hypothesis is ρ = 1, which 
means that y t is non-stationary, against the alternative ρ < 1 that indicates that y t is 
stationary. 
Equation (1) is not operational until the number of lags p is determined. Several 
studies suggest that the sequential general to specific rule, as described in Hall (1994), is 
superior to other alternatives.
19 Hall recommends starting with an arbitrary large p, to test 
for significance of the last coefficient, and to reduce p iteratively until the first significant 
statistics is encountered. Starting with p max = 15 the paper finds that the last coefficient is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 If a non-stationarity variable is present in the model, such statistics as t, R
 2 and F-statistics do 
not retain their traditional characteristics and cannot be used in statistical inference. 
18 In practice, to determine if variables are cointegrated, one needs to address a number of issues. 
First, the variables should be tested on stationarity. If the dependent variable is found to be stationary, it can 
be used in levels. If it is non-stationary, both dependent and proposed explanatory variables are tested on 
the order of integration, which is the number of differences that one takes to make series stationary. If the 
dependent and explanatory variables are of the same order, the next step is to run a cointegrating regression 
to find if there exists a combination of two that is stationary. If tests show that there is, this combination is 
included as an error-correction term in the final econometric specification that is analyzed by the means of 
regular OLS regression. 
19 See Maddala and Kim (1998, p. 78).   13
significant when p = 6. All three statistics that are used to test for unit-root indicate that 
the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected at a 10 percent level.
20 
The results of the ADF test should not be relied upon blindly because the test has 
several shortcomings. The most relevant to the present study is the critique mounted by 
Perron (1989). He argues that the ADF test does not account for the possibility of a 
structural break and recommends including in equation (1) dummies that represent 
changes in intercept or time trend or both. His specification is of the form 
∑
=
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where D is a dummy variable associated with the break. Perron is not specific about how 
to detect the timing of the break assuming that it should be obvious. A visual examination 
of Figure 1 shows that the default of August 1998 had a significant effect on the NMT 
trend and, hence, can be considered as the prime candidate for a structural break if any. 
The results of all three statistics of the OLS regression of equation (2) reject the null 
hypothesis that the series is non-stationary at the level of 1 percent. The break is detected 
in both intercept and time trend.
21 
The results of the Perron’s test are significant. First, trend-stationarity of the NMT 
series precludes its cointegration. Thus searching for a stable long-run causal 
relationship, à la Engle and Granger, appears to be fruitless. Second, the stability of the 
time trend shown by the NMT prior and after the default attracts attention to pre- and 
                                                           
20 They are t-test, F-test, and K-test The first two tests are regular and need not be introduced. It 
suffices to say that F-test checks the null hypothesis that coefficients β0 and (ρ-1) are jointly zero. K-test is 
specific. It checks if (ρ-1) is found to be zero because observations are autocorrelated of the order of p. The 
results of the tests are –1.276, 1.627, and -3.956 while their critical values at 10 percent for 100 
observations are –3.15, 5.47, and -17.5 respectively. Critical values for the tests are taken from Hamilton 
(1994), Tables B5-7. 
21 The results of t-test, F-test, and K-test are –7.625, 53.72, and –127.7 while their critical values at   14
post-default institutional arrangements that are likely to influence NMT for a significant 
period of time. Finally, the results suggest that if the main hypothesis advanced in this 
paper is correct, the default somehow affected the cost and availability of external funds.  
These considerations indicate that causes for the NMT can be hidden in institutional 
changes that happened around August 1998. They should be explored. 
 
3.  The Post-default Institutional Changes and NMT in Russia 
Let us restate the working hypothesis advanced in this paper: NMT develops 
when the cost and availability of external funds become a problem. If it is true, the fact 
that the Russia’s NMT reversed its trend after the default suggests that monetary trade 
became cheaper or feasible after 1998. Let us consider the chronology of events to 
discover how the cost and availability of external funds might be affected by the default. 
The inability of the Federal Government to serve its debt is the immediate cause 
of the default.
22 It did not happen because the government experienced a sudden drop in 
its revenue or had to spend more due to some unforeseen contingencies. Both the federal 
revenue and expenditure stayed about the same. What the government failed to 
accomplish was to follow through with its debt management plan. It could neither raise 
the expected amount of funds at domestic or foreign financial markets nor reschedule the 
payment of matured debts. The fact that lenders refused to roll over state debts suggests 
that the market for government bonds was satiated. In fact, as may be seen on Figure 2, 
the fraction of state debts in the loan portfolio of domestic banks crossed the 40 percent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 percent for 100 observations are –4.8, 8.73, and –43.6 respectively. Critical values for the tests are taken 
from Perron (1989, Tables VI A-B) for t-test and K-test and Hamilton (1994, Table B7) for F-test. 
22 Some economists argued that the default was accidental and could be avoided if circumstances 
were more favorable (author’s private correspondence with economists working in international financial   15
level in November 1996 and hovered around this mark for almost two years. Could the 
collapse of the market for state debt make monetary trade cheaper? 
  
Figure 2: Fraction of government bonds in the total loan portfolio of the domestic 
banking system, in percent. Sources: Share of state securities in total banking loan portfolio is found 
as the ratio of loans extended to the government to the sum of loans extended to government and public and 
private enterprises by commercial banking system. Data are for May – November 1993 from RET (2002), 
series 461: outstanding stock of GKO-OFZ adjusted to match data for December 1993; for December 1993 
– March 1995 from IMF (1996) quarterly data, interpolated in between; and from June 1995 on from CBR 
(2002). 
Yes, by two counts. First, when the demand of the Russian government for loans 
was high, it crowded out private investments, and the real interest rate went up. After the 
default the government was denied access to credit markets, which effectively 
experienced a fall in the aggregate demand. Correspondingly, as Figure 3b attests, the 
real interest rate decreased and producers could borrow money at lesser cost. Second, the 
post-default government had to bring its monetary and fiscal policies in conformance 
with new realities. It restructured state debts to failed banks, extended necessary credit to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
organizations). Yet, such ex post rationalization does not reject the fact that the liquidity of the Federal 
































large banks, cleared mutual debts between taxpayers and state agencies, and moved to 
balance the federal budget. These actions resulted, in due time, in a real growth in money 
supply visible on Figure 3a.
23 
  ( a )        ( b )  
Figure 3: real M2 aggregate (a) and annual real interest rate on commercial loans 
(b); both deflated by industrial PPI. Sources: RET (2002), series 488: M2 after December 1996 and, 
for 1992-6, the difference between series 639: M2X including foreign deposits and 640: foreign deposits; 
series 372: industrial PPI. Real interest rate: Found according to the formula r t = Ln [(1 + i t)/(PPI t/PPI t-
1)
12], where i t is the average nominal annual interest rate on commercial loans extended to up to one year 
and PPI t is the producer price index for month t. i t for 1991 is taken from IET (1991), Table 16; for 1992 – 
from RET (1993-1), Table 7; for 1993 – from IET (1993), Figure 5; for 1994-5 – from RET (1996-1), 
Table 23; for later period –CBR (2002). 
                                                           
23 A post-default increase in the fraction of government loans kept by domestic banking system is 
an artifact. The government restructured payments to commercial banks on its frozen obligations the total 
sum of which grew. Simultaneously, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) extended credit to the same banks 
under effective collateral of their loans to the government. This conjecture can be deduced from the 
dynamics of two indicators. The CBR’s net credit to banks (in real terms) grew steeply after the default and 
fell rapidly after September 1999. The fraction of government loans in banking loan portfolio grew after the 
default fell after August 1999. 
One might speculate why a higher money supply was not countered with a similar increase in 
prices. Possibly, the fact that the government restructured and not monetized its debt and moved to boost its 








































































The other consequence of the default was that the established composition of 
money holdings was upset. According to the Arrow-Debreu model, who owns liquid 
funds does not matter. However, this theoretical proposition is valid only if financial 
markets are perfectly integrated, that is when savers move funds to borrowers at no cost. 
Only then money finds its optimal employment automatically. When the markets are 
fragmented, the cost of financial intermediation is significant and the structure of savers 
and borrowers starts to matter. One problem lies in the inherent riskiness of lending 
discussed above. When the expected risk of default increases, external lenders charge a 
higher risk premium or refuse to extend uncollateralized loans altogether. The other 
problem is the existence of institutional barriers to lending. For example, pension funds 
are required to keep a large portion of their assets in low-risk securities, say government 
bonds. If, for some reason, savers move deposits from commercial banks to pension 
funds, private borrowers discover that the supply of loans has dried up. In both instances 
credit is rationed according to the definition provided in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
24 
The proposition that financial markets were fragmented in the Russian transition 
is uncontroversial. There was no commercial banking system in the USSR whose banks 
were little more than accounting establishments double-checking enterprises’ compliance 
with the state plans. When such banks were relieved of control functions, they had no 
expertise in operating with household deposits. Newly established banks, that were 
mostly organized to serve trade operations, had no interest working with small savers 
either. The latter traditionally kept savings at the Sberbank (State Saving Bank), which 
                                                           
24 They define that credit is rationed when “… there are identifiable groups of individuals … who, 
with a given supply of credit, are unable to obtain loans at any rate, even though with a larger supply of   18
was a special institution that was required by the banking regulations to keep a significant 
part of its assets in state securities. Thus a steady growth in the fraction of money funds 
held by households prior to the default amounted to an effective drop in commercial 
credit supply. More important, when the composition of money holdings as shown on 
Figure 4 shifted in favor of households, the amount of internal funds available to 
producers shrank. After 1998 producers controlled a larger fraction of money funds and 
needed to borrow less.
25 Correspondingly, the problems associated credit rationing 
became less severe. 
 
Figure 4: Fraction of household money holdings in the total amount of money in 
circulation, cash and deposits, in percent. Sources: Fraction of cash and deposits in domestic and 
foreign currency held by households (HH) in broad M2 aggregate including deposits in foreign currency. 
Data on money holdings by households is reported in RET (2002), series 200: HH cash holdings, 201: HH 
deposits at Sberbank, 202: HH deposits at commercial banks, 204: HH deposits in foreign currency, and 
639: broad money aggregate M2X. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
credit, they would” (1981, p. 395). 
25 Partially, it happened because household deposits, kept in failed banks, were frozen in illiquid 














































Third, the default affected the demand for domestic goods. As the market 
exchange rate rose from 6.24 Rbl/$ at the end of July 1998 to 20.84 Rbl/$ five months 
later, massive import substitution took place.
26 Trade turnover accelerated, the stock of 
accumulated inventories dwindled, and producers needed less working capital for its 
maintenance.
27 Figure 5 demonstrates how the ratio of inventories held by retailers to 
industrial output changed over time. 
 
Figure 5: Ratio of the value of inventories kept at registered retail establishments 
at the end of month to monthly industrial output. Sources: RET (2002), series 186: stocks of 
consumer goods in registered retail trade and 275: industrial output at current prices. 
 
4.  Other Structural Changes in NMT and Monetary Indicators 
The preceding discussion shows that the investigation of the institutional changes 
initiated by the default of 1998 has been fruitful. In particular, it has revealed a structural 
                                                                                                                                                                             
government extended targeted new credit with the aim of providing financial relief to enterprises. 
26 See RET (2002), series 516: simple average monthly exchange rate at the Moscow International 
Currency Exchange. 
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link between NMT and producers’ access to money funds. Let us continue this line of 
research and look for other potential structural breaks in the NMT series and, if there are 
any, to explore institutional changes associated with these periods. The first step is to de-
trend the series thus removing the effect of the default. The regression of the NMT series 
on intercept, time parameter, and dummies associated with the break of August 1998 
produces the following results 
) 04 . 0 ( ) 87 . 3 ( ) 01 . 0 ( ) 63 . 0 (
) 3 ( ) 73 . 1 137 ( 66 . 0 66 . 1 98 t t e t D t NMT + − + + − =
 
where D 98 = 0 until and including August 1998 and 1 – afterwards and the numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors. If the NMT series has a single structural break of August 
1998, residuals e t should not exhibit time trends.
28 Figure 6 presents the graph of the 
NMT residuals. 
Figure 6: the NMT error term from equation (3). Source: author’s calculations 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
discussed above. Konstantin Loukine has suggested this point. 
28 It has been determined in Section 2 that the NMT series is trend-stationary. However, the 
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A visual investigation of the graph reveals several trends thus questioning the 
stability of specification presented by equation (3). Since timing of the breaks is 
unknown, a CUSUM test for its stability is appropriate.
29 The test requires separating a 
sample into two sub-samples and running an OLS regression of the specification to be 
tested on the first sub-sample. Obtained estimates of coefficients are used to forecast 
estimates of the dependent variable. The forecast values are checked against actual 
observations of the second sub-sample. If the forecast errors are persistently high, the 
stability of the model becomes questionable. The CUSUM test reveals three structural 
breaks for the model of the form 
) 4 ( t t e t NMT + + = β α  
Two of them correspond to major political changes in Russia: President Eltzin’s re-
election in July 1996 and the end of the coalition government of Prime Minister 
Primakov in May 1999. The third break occurred between February and June 1994 when 
the real interest rate moved into positive territory after monetary authority tightened 
money supply and fiscal authority stopped borrowing from the Central Bank of Russia 
(CBR).
30 
Political upheavals are not a part of the story up to now. Theoretically, they are 
coincidental to NMT. However, what happens in political sphere may affect monetary 
markets that, in its turn, influence producers’ choice of trade. Let us check if the series 
associated with the cost of and access to external funds and NMT have the breaks at the 
                                                           
29 In this case it is the test of the cumulative sums of the residuals. The paper employs the test as it 
is described in Greene (1990, p. 225). 
30 See Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Government and CBR was signed in 
May of 1993. Its true implementation started in the end of 1993 and was completed before January 1995.   22
same time. Since the timing for the breaks is defined, the regular Chow test can be used. 
Consider that a series y t trends in time and its trend changes over the period or 
) 5 ( ) ( 0 0 t z z
Z z
z t t D t y ε β α β α + + + + = ∑
∈
 
where Z is equal to the number of breaks, four in this case, and D z is a dummy associated 
with break z. If y has a break at z, omitting D z results in a significant loss of the 
goodness-of-fit, which is detected by F-statistics. The results of F-tests for the existence 
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debt in total 
banking loans 
y: NMT 
D = 1 after February 1994 and D = 0 before  24.211 24.363  223.806  12.806 
D = 1 after June 1996 and D = 0 before  2.826  13.087 218.485  5.632 
D = 1 after August 1998 and D = 0 before  26.572 35.982  34.842  39.410 
D = 1 after May 1999 and D = 0 before  6.698 12.219  134.725  10.920 
Memo: Critical value: F (2, 109) at 1 percent  4.82 
 
Table 1: F-statistics for the test of structural breaks. Values significant at 1 
percent are in bold. Source: author’s calculations 
 
The obtained results show that the series associated with easiness of external 
financing and the NMT series exhibit breaks at the same time. This finding supports the 
proposition that changes in the time trend displayed by NMT were reactions to structural 
changes in financial markets that, in its turn, were caused by major political innovations. 
Let us consider how policy regime changes have influenced external finance in each 
particular case. The first break, identified by February 1994, coincided with a major drop 
                                                           
31 Parameters for the F-test are equal to: J = 2, T = 119, and K = 10. The series under   23
in the inflation rate.
32 Given a downward price stickiness or, alternatively, persistent 
inflationary expectations of suppliers, market prices stayed above equilibrium level. 
Consumer demand fell while inventories accumulated relative to output as shown on 
Figure 5. As inventories grew, producers needed more liquid funds for their maintenance 
but their increased demand for money was not satisfied. Another development took place 
in the market for bank deposits. The fraction of deposits that households kept at 
commercial banks peaked in February 1994. After several bank panics during this time, 
households gradually shifted deposits to a safer, insured by the state, Sberbank. The latter 
kept assets predominantly in government securities in conformance with existing 
regulations.
33 This change in the saving behavior of households resulted in effective 
contraction of credit supply available to private borrowers. These two considerations 
explain why the NMT growth accelerated after February 1994. 
The second break, associated with the presidential election of 1996, affected the 
market for government securities. The failure of the communist challenger to win the 
elections raised expectations of political stability. Subsequently, the federal government 
became able to borrow abroad. The effective supply of loans increased and the real 
interest rate dropped as one can see on Figure 3b.
34 As external funds became more 
available, the growth in NMT decelerated. The third break represents the regime change 
that took place after the Primakov’s government resigned in May 1999. The new 
                                                                                                                                                                             
consideration are trend-stationary as shown in the next section. So, F-test generates unbiased results. 
32 A tighter monetary policy of the CBR is largely responsible for the drop in inflation rate The 
CBR raised the refinancing rate on loans extended to commercial banks above the inflation rate for the first 
time in the end of 1993. 
33 See series 201 and 202 of RET (2002) on households’ deposits kept at both types of banks. 
34 Potentially, the opportunity to borrow abroad was the lifeline thrown to the Federal Government 
of that time by international organizations. The effective reserve ratio, which is the ratio of reserves to 
deposits kept by commercial banks, reached its lowest point in May 1996. Further lending to the 
government was likely to endanger the liquidity of the commercial banking system that headed to imminent   24
government reversed the policy of easy credit that was aimed at clearing mutual arrears 
and the real interest rate started to grow thus making external funding more expensive. 
Households weathered the storm and their share of money holdings increased once more. 
Finally, trade turnover stopped accelerating indicating that a boom prompted by steep 
currency depreciation was over. As inventories accumulated, producers needed more 
funds for their maintenance. All these developments increased the cost and made external 
funds less available. Producers responded by slowing the rate of decline in NMT. 
 
5.  Explaining Transitory Fluctuations in NMT 
The previous sections have presented evidence supporting the proposition that 
Russia’s NMT has been caused by structural changes that took place in financial markets. 
The paper has found that the cost and availability of external funds changed structurally 
at the same points in time as for the NMT series.
35 It has concluded that political 
innovations were responsible for these developments. However, the paper has provided 
no reason for distinguishing between long- and short-term effects that perturbations in 
financial markets make on producers’ choice of trade. This section shows that the same 
indicators as above can explain transitory fluctuations in the NMT series as well. 
To explore temporary shocks, a researcher needs to distinguish between trends 
and fluctuations. To separate one from the other one can either difference a series until it 
becomes stationary or remove its time trend. The second method is preferable because it 
                                                                                                                                                                             
financial crash. 
35 Certainly, the proposed importance of financial intermediation to trade is based on the 
assumption that producers rely on borrowed funds to transact. This assumption is generally considered to 
be uncontroversial. Normally, producers keep low money balances. 
In the Russian case there might be a twist in this story. Tax authorities, as punishment for tax 
arrears, blocked many enterprises’ bank accounts (up to 80 percent by some estimates). This constraint 
became less binding after the default when the government restructured tax obligations for many taxpayers.   25
has been already used in this paper.
36 The explanatory series are, in fact, trend-stationary 
as all three statistics of the Perron’s test reported in Table 2 show. 
 
  t-test  K-test  F-test 
Fraction of M2 held by households (M2HH)  -5.50 -51.26  29.70 
Ratio of retail inventories to industrial output (MT)  -8.37 -104.51  68.75 
Critical values at 1%, 100 observations  -4.8  -43.6  8.73 
 
Table 2: Results of the Perron’s test of trend-stationarity. Source: OLS regressions of 
equation (2). Author’s calculations 
 
Note that the transformation of variables does not affect their relationship if the 
accepted form of linear specification is correct. Running regression 
) 6 ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
6 5 t t t t de a Tr H H M2 T M N ω β β + + =  
where the hat sign denotes the error terms obtained with equation (5) generates the same 
results as regression that uses the original data of the form 
) 6 ( ) ( 6 5
4
1
0 0 a Trade M2HH t D t NMT t t t
j
j j j t ω β β β α β α + + + + + + = ∑
=
 
where the coefficientsα’s andβ’s with subscripts from 0 to 4 are fixed. 
The OLS regression based on equation (6) produces autoregressive residuals ω
^
 t 
according to the results of Durbin-Watson and Box-Pierce tests of autocorrelation.
37 Thus 
a further transformation is appropriate. The two-stage FGLS regression solves this 
                                                           
36 That is to use the residual of equation (5). It should be noted that the author has checked that the 
explanatory variables are not cointegrated in the sense of Engle and Granger (1987). Hence, it is impossible 
to construct their stationary combination and to use it as an explanatory variable instead of differencing. 
37 DW test result is 1.456, which is outside the acceptance interval of [1.725, 2.275]. Box-Pierce 
test (with three lags) produces 32.433 whenever the critical value of χ
 2 (3) for 0.95 percent is 7.815. A   26
problem.
38 The paper employs the following procedure. First, it determines the order of 
autocorrelation and estimates autocorrelation coefficient(s). The examination of 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of ω
^
 t shows that it follows AR (1) 
process.
39 To estimate the correlation coefficient between ω
^
 t and ω
^
 t-1, the OLS 
regression of ω
^
 t on its one-month lagged value is run and the obtained coefficient is 
transformed according to Theil’s method arriving at ρ = 0.233. Next, each variable v, 
used in equation (6), is recalculated according to the formula 
) 7 ( ˆ ˆ ~
1 − × − = t t t v v v ρ  
Finally, the OLS regression is applied to the variables recalculated with equation (7). Its 
results are reported in Table 3. 
 
  β  t-statistic   P-value 
Fraction of M2 held by households  12.532  2.237  0.027 
Ratio of retail inventories to industrial output  24.642 4.387  0.000 
R
 2  0.262 
T  119 
Durbin-Watson test of autocorrelation: the acceptance 
region for no autocorrelation is [1.725,2.275]  1.92 
Box-Pierce test of autocorrelation (with three lags): critical 
value of χ
 2 (3) at 0.95 percent is 7.815 
-3.432 
 
Table 3: The results of FGLS regression with variables being recalculated 
according to equation (7) to account for autoregressive residuals. Source: author’s 
calculations 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
technical description of both tests can be found inter alia in Greene (1990, p. 453)  
38 The FGLS (Feasible Generalized Least Squares) regression as described in Greene (1990, p. 
443) has been employed in this paper. The Theil’s transformation formula can be found at the same page. 
39 The author has used GRETL statistical package to plot autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelation functions and Vandaele (1983, Ch. 4) to identify the order of autocorrelation.   27
The results show that transitory changes in the fraction of money funds external to 
producers and in their money demand influence the choice of trade. Thus the link 
between the Russia’s NMT and producers’ access to external funds goes beyond identical 
reactions to major policy events.
40 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper has pursued two interrelated questions. First, it has contributed to the 
ongoing debate about the existence and importance of the credit channel of monetary 
policy. The previous literature has suggested that firms are sensitive to monetary 
contractions thus implying that the access to liquidity influences their output decisions.
41 
The paper has broadened the argument noting that firms can compensate for the lack of 
monetary liquidity with greater reliance on non-monetary trade (NMT). It has presented 
evidence confirming that the credit rationing played a role in the development of the 
Russia’s NMT. Second, the paper has advanced the understanding of NMT that some 
economists thought was a phenomenon specific to transition economies. It has detailed 
and interpreted key episodes associated with its development in Russia and shown that a 
number of institutional barriers and policy developments; such as weak banking system, 
excessive state borrowing, and inflationary expectations; have fostered the growth in 
NMT. In this respect the paper has shown that NMT is a tractable event that can be 
successfully explored within the framework of mainstream economic theory. 
 
                                                           
40 A similar result is obtained by Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) who find that inventory 
investments by firms without access to public bond markets appears to be affected by liquidity constraints. 
41 Walsh (2003, p. 361) provides a summary of this work.   28
The paper has presented evidence that is broadly compatible with other works on 
credit rationing in general and the Russia’s NMT in particular. It has found that structural 
changes in monetary policy and bank crises permanently changed the role played by 
NMT and, by all appearances, aggravated the Russian depression of 1992-8. Here, the 
present paper is closely related to the work originated by Bernanke (1983). Further, it has 
stressed the importance of firms’ access to sources of liquid funds. It has been shown that 
when firms experienced an outflow of liquid funds or an increase in the duration of trade 
cycle, they mitigated their lack of necessary liquidity by relying on NMT more. This 
aspect of corporate policy that fits nicely the intuition advanced in Holmström and Tirole 
(1998) has been previously overlooked. The main argument of the paper, which is that 
changes in the cost of external finance and credit rationing were responsible for NMT, 
has been found compatible with other works dealing with NMT in transition. 
The paper has indicated two general topics for further research. The first is of 
general theoretic nature. It has been argued that models of the choice of trade, particularly 
the search model of money, are incomplete because they exclude inter-temporal NMT 
from the consideration. The line of argumentation accepted in this paper leads to belief 
that NMT may be an imperfect substitute for lacking banking services. If this suggestion 
is true, developing a role for inter-temporal NMT in the search models of money will 
highlight the special role played by banks in financial intermediation. The second topic 
that the paper suggests is empirical. The present macroeconomic analysis has provided 
evidence supporting the existence of the credit channel of monetary policy in the Russian 
transition. However, different firms reacted to credit rationing differently. What 
determines differences in responses is a legitimate question to ask. It is interesting to   29
explore if the proposition that the means of non-monetary payment, in particular bills of 
exchange, were traded at a premium that traders paid for their role as a substitute for 
missing liquidity. Another proposition that follows from Holmström and Tirole (2000) 
asserts that as liquidity becomes constrained, projects with lower net return or longer 
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